An Assessment of Major Institutions Enabling Devolution in Kenya and Their Consequential Effects

By Javas Bigambo

(This article was first originally published on December 21, 2021 by The Africa Centre For Ideas and Dialogue Program (ACIDP).

After decades of centralised governance dating back to the colonial era, Kenyans resolved to transition to a system where powers and governance are shared between the centre and the devolved units. 

Governance Expert Javas Bigambo

As such, devolution was introduced in Kenya through a new constitutional dispensation, by the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 that divided Kenya into 47 counties. Kenya’s devolved system is provided for in Article 1 (3) and (4); Article 6 (1) and (2); Chapter Eleven and in the First, Fourth and Section 15 of the Sixth Schedules.

Devolution is a “system of multilevel government under which the Constitution creates two distinct and interdependent levels of government – the national and the county – that are required to carry out their mutual relations in a consultative and cooperative manner.” County governments have been argued as being “relatively autonomous and coordinate” rather than subordinate to the national government. 

Article 189 makes it imperative that each level of government performs and exercises its powers in a manner that respects the functional and institutional integrity as well as the constitutional status of institutions of government at the other level. The Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012 establishes the legal and institutional framework for consultation, cooperation and dispute resolution between the national and county governments and amongst the county governments. 

The Constitution of Kenya 2010, specifically through Article 174 and Article 175 that set out the objects and principles of devolution respectively, there are key statutes that guide the national and county governments in enabling devolved governance. 

The operationalisation of the county governments commenced following the March 2013 general elections. For the first time, county governors, deputy governors, senators and county women representatives were elected. These 47 new county governments preside over devolved functions such as the provision of health care, pre-primary education, and maintenance of local roads, which were previously the responsibility of the national government. 

Counties can identify problems, make policies, plan, and collect revenue, execute the budget, accounting, auditing and monitoring and evaluation and citizen participation in decision-making.

Transition to county governance and implementation of devolution required the building of new institutions, abandonment or restructuring of some of the old institutions, and shifting of roles, responsibilities, and accompanying resources between the two levels of government. Furthermore, it required not only a change in structures and systems but also a change in governance culture by adopting a culture that is compatible with the Constitution. 

To achieve this, the Constitution provided for a three-year transition period after the March 2013 general election to put in place the appropriate legal, policy, and institutional measures to facilitate the implementation of devolved governance. The principle of devolution involves shared governance at the national level and self-governance at the devolved level.

Institutions that enable Devolution

The Ministry of Devolution 

This is a province of the national government and plays a critical role in policy formulation. The State Department for Devolution (SDD) draws its mandate from Articles 6, 10 and Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya; the Executive Order No. 1 of June 2018 (Revised) and the various Acts under which devolution is implemented including the Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012, County Governments Act, 2012, Urban Areas and Cities Act 2011, and Public Finance Management Act 2012. 

The approval of the Devolution Policy by the Cabinet in October 2016 was particularly significant. The policy is founded on the sovereignty of the people of Kenya, the supremacy of the Constitution, national values and principles of governance, the Bill of Rights, the objects of devolution and the principles of devolved governments. 

The Council of Governors (CoG) 

Section 19 of the Intergovernmental Relations Act 2012 establishes the Council of Governors. Its mandate is to facilitate consultations amongst county governments, sharing of information on the performance of the counties in the execution of their functions with the objective of learning and promotion of best practice and where necessary, initiating preventive or corrective action. 

Also, considering matters of common interest to counties, dispute resolution between counties, facilitating capacity building for governors, receiving reports and monitoring the implementation of inter-county agreements on inter-county projects, among others. The CoG was formally constituted in March 2013 and currently has 12 sectoral committees and four support units to guide its operations.

The Senate

Chapter eight of the Constitution establishes the Legislature. Article 93 states that “There is established a Parliament of Kenya,” (Parliament), “which shall consist of the National Assembly and the Senate.” The two Houses of Parliament shall perform their respective functions under the Constitution as stated in Article 93 (2) of the Constitution.

The Senate’s overall function is to protect the interests of the counties and their governments. Article 96 articulates its role in making law, and determining the allocation of national revenue among counties; Article 217 overseeing national revenue allocated to county governments, while Article 145 and 150(2) in considering and determining any resolution to impeach the President and Deputy President, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Senate and Governors.

The Constitution further gives Parliament budgetary oversight powers. Allocation of national revenue is a critical role played by the Senate, in ensuring adequate resources for the functioning of county governments. This role focuses on the division of revenue between the national and county governments. Article 217(1) mandates the Senate to determine, by resolution, the basis for allocating the share of national revenue that is allocated annually to the county level of government. 

Immediately after the approval of the Division of Revenue Bill, the Senate is charged with considering, deliberating and voting on the County Allocation of Revenue Bill which divides revenue allocated to the county level of government amongst the counties using the formula developed by the Senate every five years as per the provisions of Article 217. Revenue Bill and County Allocation of Revenue Bill must be introduced in Parliament at least two months before the end of each financial year.

Controller of Budget 

The Constitution splits the Controller and Auditor General’s Office by establishing two separate independent offices: the Auditor General’s Office and the Office of the Controller of Budget.

The Office of the Controller of Budget (OCoB) is an independent office established under Article 228 of the Constitution of Kenya mandated to oversee implementation of the budgets of the national and county governments by authorizing a withdrawal from public funds under Articles 204, 206 and 207. 

Every four months, the Office is required to submit to each House of Parliament a report on the implementation of the budgets of the national and county governments. It is also required to prepare, publish and publicize statutory reports, conduct investigations and conduct alternative resolution mechanisms to resolve disputes.

According to the 2019 State of Devolution Address , in the period between 2018 and 2019, county governments made significant strides in sustaining devolution gains across various functions. 

Commission on Revenue Allocation

The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) is an independent Commission defined in Articles 215 and 216 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, mandated to recommend the basis for equitable sharing of revenues and financial management of both the national government and county governments. Additionally, under Article 216(4) it determines, publishes and regularly review a policy setting out the criteria to identify marginalized areas for purposes of Article 204(2)[12].

County Assembly

Article 176 (Chapter Eleven) establishes county governments consisting of a County Assembly and a County Executive. The major role of the members of the County Assembly in Kenya is legislation, representation, and oversight. 

According to Section 8 of the County Governments Act, the County Assembly shall vet and approve nominees for appointment to county public offices, perform the roles set out under Article 185 of the Constitution, and approve the budget and expenditure of the county government per Article 207 of the Constitution. 

Also, the legislation contemplated in Article 220 (2) of the Constitution, guided by Articles 201 and 203 of the Constitution, approve the borrowing by the county government per Article 212 of the Constitution, approve county development planning and perform any other role as may be set out under the Constitution or legislation.

Sadly, it continues to emerge that County Assemblies are merely used to rubber-stamp the decisions of the County Executive. The aspired independence and strong oversight role are not playing out as desired by the people.

The county budget and economic forum

The Public Finance Management Act, 2012 establishes the County Budget and Economic Forum to provide a platform for consultation by the county government on the preparation of county plans, the County Fiscal Strategy Paper and the Budget Review and Outlook Paper for the County. 

This forum also discusses matters related to budgeting, the economy, and financial management at the county level. The membership of this important consultative body is drawn from organizations representing professionals, business, labour issues, women, persons with disabilities, and the elderly and faith-based groups at the county level. 

Demonstrable Failure by Institutions Enabling Devolution

Inadequate and delay in disbursement of funds

This is one challenge that is experienced across the board by all 47 counties. The shortage of funds in counties has primarily been caused by the insufficient allocation of money from the national government. Additionally, the allocation of funds is more often delayed and irregular which greatly cripples the ability of the county governments to run and provide essential services. 

The same way the national treasury is working with national government ministries and parastatals is the same way it should be dealing with the county governments. The national treasury should release funds to counties quarterly rather than monthly to facilitate proper internal planning by county governments, and to avoid unnecessary monthly delays, which affects the implementation of programmes and projects.

Duplication of roles and a bloated workforce

The failure by the national government to fully devolve certain functions is a major impediment of devolution. Pre-primary education is, for example, managed by the county governments whereas all other levels of education are managed by the national government. In addition, the national government has not fully organized the various ministries in line with the devolved structure, thus creating barriers in the implementation of duties and accountability issues.

This has resulted in conflicts between the two levels of government in the performance of roles since both employ workers who end up performing similar roles. Such overlaps are solely responsible for the inflated wage bill. There is a very thin line between some of the offices at the national level. This is a challenge in maintaining checks and balances of the county executive by the county assembly.

Unnecessary interference by the national government

In the case of the International Legal Consultancy Group & another v Ministry of Health, the national government procured medical equipment for use in county health facilities. A conflict arose when the national government demanded that the counties ought to pay for the equipment, which had been procured at very exorbitant prices.

This is a clear illustration of the national government meddling in the county governments’ affairs and further illustrates a situation where the county governments do not act independently, as they were designed to, but rather as puppets of the national government.

Lack of adequate public participation

The general citizenry has not been involved fully in public participation in the counties. For instance, Makueni County was almost dissolved, as the public was not involved in the budgetary allocation process. The County Assembly passed unconstitutional bills including the Makueni County wards development funds that allowed the leader of the majority to determine the amount to be awarded to each ward. This was

The court in some instances has nullified some of these laws due to unconstitutionality and inconsistency in the processes. For instance, the Kiambu Finance Act was nullified for lack of public participation.

Gaps in law and absence of relevant policies

Currently, a governor leads the County Government of Nairobi without a deputy following resignation. The law is not clear on what should happen in such a situation thus becoming a challenge.

Policy recommendations 

Public participation be enhanced as per Article 174 (c)

The counties should prioritize involving their population on any issue before taking a stand. It matters not whether the matter is trivial. The gatherings should also be made in open common ground and not segregated hotels, as was the case with Kiambu County. Enhancement of people participation in affairs and determination of their destiny in county governments will facilitate openness hence curbing corruption.

Addressing inadequate budget hence promoting social and economic development as per Article 174 (f)

The county governments should develop innovative ideas to generate revenue to boost their annual allocations. The county assemblies should also enact laws that promote mobilisation of local resources and revenue collection to boost its income to meet the expectation of the people. 

Embracing public-private partnerships and sustainable borrowing could be options to assist them in implementing county development plans. Counties can borrow from Machakos where social amenities such as the people’s park charges entry fees.

Coordination between the two levels of government

The constant conflicts pitting the national and some county governments should be alleviated through proper collaboration between the two levels of government to achieve smooth operational existence. The mutual understanding between the two levels of government goes towards improving service delivery and attaining the requirements set by the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

Counties should be encouraged to take arbitration to solve their differences. In Central Kenya, Nyandarua and Laikipia are feuding over taxation in the commercial hub of Nyahururu town; they should be encouraged to arbitrate.

Need to define the role of deputy governor and appointment in case of vacancy.

Article 180 of the CoK 2010 and the County Government Act, 2012 should be amended to provide for clear roles for the Deputy Governor. This will cure the anomalies and political tussles as witnessed in the case of the Nairobi County Government. 

Separation of powers

There is a need to enhance the separation of powers between county executives and county assemblies by ensuring direct allocation of funds to county assemblies through national assemblies. This will make County Assemblies not beholden to the County Executive for operations. It will also reduce arm-twisting of County Assemblies by County Executive. 

Abolishment of foreign benchmarking trips

Eliminate wastage of public resources through irrelevant benchmarking trips and promote transparency and prudent utilization of public resources.

Strengthen roles and functions of enabling organs

Key enabling organs of devolution such as the Summit and IEBC should be strengthened and released from the grip of the national government. Currently, only the President can call for a Summit meeting at his pleasure. This leaves the Council of Governors compromised and weakened.

Conclusion

The existing institutions that enable devolution in Kenya continue to demonstrate their functionality, even though their roles can be perfected. The policy and legal framework provide for fundamental institutions that enable the wheels of devolved governance to work effectively in Kenya. The uncompromising execution of mandates by those institutions is the answer to the various hiccups in devolved governance in Kenya. Further, there is a need for sufficient political goodwill at the National and County levels, because that removes unnecessary bottlenecks. 

Mr Bigambo, a lawyer and political scientist, is managing consultant at Interthoughts Consulting

Election Preparedness: Institutionalising Presidential Transitions in Kenya

By Javas Bigambo

(This article was first originally published on October 13, 2021 by The Africa Centre For Ideas and Dialogue Program (ACIDP).

Elections have a natural way of disrupting the status quo, especially when the people’s will is respected and sealed through new social contracts for governance. Democracy is sustained through regular, predictable, dependable and transparent elections.

In political democracies, no doubt, each time a country goes to a general election, it does so not just to sustain its democracy but also to re-negotiate and reclaim its nationhood. Ideally, elections serve to advance the aspirations, goals and values of the majoritarian collective. 

Election preparedness must be given the collective seriousness it deserves.

In most elections, the institution of the presidency is at the centre of electoral politics. The attendant power that it wields makes it a hot contest between opponents at the end of each electoral cycle. The incumbent is either keen to retain the seat or pass on to a preferred successor, while the opposition wants to ascend to the seat.

Writing on the performance of African political parties after the ‘Third Wave’, Carrie Manning (2005) noted that since the early 1990s, many countries in Africa embraced multi-party democracy. However, few of the elections conducted during the period were successfully democratic. The incumbents returned to power after extensively manipulating the electoral process.

Across the African continent, there were only a few cases of successful competitive electoral democracies in countries such as Botswana, Senegal and Mauritius, which had held competitive elections before the opening of democratic space in the early 1990s. The list also includes countries such as Benin, Malawi and Zambia, which had successful transitions through elections

Kenya’s nation- state has been a constitutional democracy since its founding in 1963. And just like in other African countries, the institution of the presidency has been at the centre of politics.

Politics of presidential transitions

The politics of presidential transitions can easily be seen through the duopoly of manipulation and political guardianship shaped by self-preservation, ethnicity, protectionism, favouritism, safeguarding primitive accumulation of wealth, and ring- fencing the political elite club that the presidency seems to be. Arguably the immediate post-independence Kenyatta regime’s key concern was securing the interests of the emerging political class through capital accumulation.

Whereas pluralism has engendered an environment of competitive elections in Kenya and other democratic ornaments such as tenure limitation, the electoral culture has remained the same, a few successful regime changes notwithstanding. 

Behind the veneer of constitutional democracy ideology is the binary between ethnic fundamentalism and elite capture of Kenya’s political space. Ethnicity has been weaponised for subjugation and emotional control. This instrumentation of ethnicity in Kenyan politics has consistently paid enormous dividends to the few elite, who use it purely for personal gain. That is precisely where the problem starts, with infinite consequences.

Since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1992, ethnic violence has reared its ugly head repeatedly around election time. Even in elections considered peaceful, as was the case in 2002 and 2013, the threat of politically instigated ethnic violence remained real.

This has continued to make presidential transitions in Kenya, a game of political survival where opponents are defeated and not ideological perpetuation or propagation of ideal nationhood.  Many political bigwigs who never succeeded in earth-shaking presidential elections were relegated to political oblivion. These include Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenneth Matiba, Simeon Nyachae, George Anyona, among others.

In over five decades now, elections in Kenya have often been the metonymy of violence and insecurity. While many general elections have been conducted in post-independence Kenya, some specific electioneering events and elections stand out. They are crucial in analysing election preparedness and presidential transitions across the election cycles. 

This article examines the remarkable presidential transitions in Kenya and the critical need for institutionalisation. 

Tracking Kenya’s presidential elections 

Firstly, is the fourth post-independence election in Kenya held in 1983. During the campaign, all contestants had to get clearance from the ruling party KANU. One of the contenders, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, and some of his former KPU party members were denied permission due to the one-party state constitution in force. 

The campaigns lasted for one month, and candidates had to prove their loyalty to President Moi. However, only 48% voted during the elections, making it the lowest figure since independence. In addition, 40 % of incumbents were voted out.

Secondly was the 1988 general election. This happened at the peak of regime consolidation under President Moi. Constitutional amendments weakened the local opposition and saw control of the presidency rise and the manipulation of the legal system. 

‘Mlolongo’, a new queue voting system, was introduced where separate queues were formed for each candidate and voters joined according to their preference. The people in each queue were then counted, and the presiding officer announced the results. However, there were incidents of violence during the campaign, and several candidates complained of being rigged out by the queue-voting system.

Thirdly, the 1992 election marked a new multi-party dispensation. Several leaders began to oppose the one-party system in the first quarter of 1990. In July of that year, public anger exploded in the Saba Saba uprising, after anti-Moi forces organised a pro-democracy rally resulting in several deaths. Pressure from local and international bodies culminated into constitutional amendments in 1991 that restored the right to form alternative political parties. However, President Moi still won the 1992 and subsequent 1997 elections.

It is noteworthy that the ethnic divide significantly contributed to widespread pre-election violence in the 1992 and 1997 elections, in which hundreds of people lost their lives. 

The eighth post-independence election in 2002 was perhaps the most significant in Kenya’s presidential transition history. The Constitution had stretched Moi’s tenure to the elastic limit. He could not seek re-election, which marked the first time a presidential transition took place through the ballot.

The run-up to the elections was marked by several significant events, including the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) asserting its independence and authority by rebuking political parties and candidates who violated the election code of conduct. This allowed for a free and fair election process.

The other significant event was the fallout in the ruling party KANU after President Moi chose Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor, and triggered a rebellion within party ranks. A group of cabinet ministers called the Rainbow Coalition opposed Moi’s choice and joined forces with the opposition to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). 

With KANU facing a united opposition for the first time, the mood for change was in the air. The campaign period was relatively peaceful, with non-partisan security by the police. Kenyans flocked to NARC rallies in droves with a new anthem, “Yote yawezakana bila Moi” (All is possible without Moi). NARC was perceived as the people’s saviour from want, corruption, misrule, mismanagement of public resources. NARC defeated KANU ending its 40-year rule.

The defeat of Moi’s preferred candidate was overwhelming and settled by a united opposition easily accounted for the subsequent smooth hand-over of power and the relative calm during the first two years of opposition leadership. 

The fifth and perhaps a turning point that dented Kenya’s history was the December 2007 elections. The incumbent Mwai Kibaki faced off with the leading opposition candidate Raila Odinga. While the actual voting was peaceful, the announcement of the presidential election results triggered violence. 

The opposition protested widespread irregularities, presumably doctoring of the presidential votes. Kenya descended into inter-ethnic violence that left over 1,000 people dead and 600,000 displaced from their homes.

In retrospect, the 2007/8 post-election violence resulted from social tensions that had built up over many years. A key factor was successive political leaders’ skewed allocation of state positions and resources.

It is noteworthy that a constant factor contributing to the related electoral violence is the ethnic divide. The centrality of ethnicity in political formations and disputes during the Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta regimes indicate the translucent veil of tribal groups always precedes the dictates of the constitutional order of presidential transitions through democratic elections. These are sustained and propagated on the whole by ethnic capitalism. 

In its organic form, political violence is an anecdotal illustration of intolerance, intimidation, and barbarism, through which insecurity instils fear among the electorate so as not to register as voters or not to turn out to vote as such political violence is always pre-meditated, targeted and financed. However, the aftermath of the 2007/08 post-election violence put into sharp focus the electoral and presidential transition dynamics in Kenya.

Codification of presidential transitions

Indeed, presidential elections and the envisaged consequence of transitions have always made general elections consequential in Kenya. Since the advent of multi-party politics in Kenya, presidential changes have been constitutionally instigated. However, the Constitution of Kenya 2010 has codified the transition procedure to avert the hurried transfer of power, as was witnessed in December 2007. 

However, not all presidential transitions in Kenya have occurred through the ballot. Under the repealed 1963 Constitution, then Vice President Daniel Arap Moi ascended into office through inheritance of leadership based on constitutional edict, without direct election by the people, after the death of President Jomo Kenyatta. 

While acting, President Moi used the three-month period to consolidate his position and marshal enough support to easily secure KANU’s final seal of approval as President in the November 1978 presidential election.

Regarding transition in the Presidency as a function of democratically held elections, Article 141 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 provides for the assumption of Office of President. Article 146 (1) provides that upon vacancy in the Office of the President, the Deputy President assumes office for the remainder of the term and necessitates no election for the President’s office.

The vacancy may occur through death, resignation, and lack of capacity. These circumstances would automatically trigger a transition in the office of the President. While this Article prescribes how the President-elect assumes office, the most significant challenges facing Kenya are primarily how succession politics are conducted due to the heavily vested interests and cutthroat competition.  

The stakes and the cards in presidential transitions

Holders of the Presidency are always obsessed with entrenching their legacies, buoyed by superiority complexes and bewildered with the thought that someone they dislike may rise and inherit the most coveted office. The consciousness of personal interests as the axis of presidential transitions is the root of comprador politics in this regard.

From 1998, Moi engaged in a carefully calculated strategy to manage the presidential succession in his and his party’s favour. He settled on Uhuru Kenyatta as his preferred successor, contrary to the aspirations of his long-serving Vice President George Saitoti. It is mysterious why Moi was determined to move the ocean to have Uhuru elected despite him being a political neophyte, devoid of personal political networks, experience, strategy or organic political ambition. 

Moi coerced the entire KANU party structure to toe the line, branding Uhuru Kenyatta as a “Moi project”, a tag that was used against him in the general elections. He was trounced by a thunderous landslide by NARC’s (opposition coalition) candidate Mwai Kibaki, in what is settled in Kenya’s history as a groundbreaking presidential transition that established democratic principles in Kenya’s politics forever.

Another major presidential transition took place during the 2013 general election. The incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, was not seeking re-election. Prime Minister Raila Odinga ran against Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta. Mr. Kenyatta trounced Raila, despite his indictment by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity following the post-election violence of 2007/08.

The subsequent general elections in 2013 and 2017 were hotly contested, highly financed and publicised. Even though the presidential transition politics were ever at a fever pitch and the election outcomes contested, the disputes were settled by the Supreme Court. All parties were at peace, ultimately, with the decisions. 

This demonstrates that however vicious the presidential competitions are if governance institutions are well resourced, independent and competent, presidential elections will not be rife with fears of clashes or bloodletting and related violence. 

How do we curate the vicious presidential transitions?

In Kenya and elsewhere across Africa, elections are a threat, primarily, to state capture fundamentalists, the self-styled elite choreographers of doing business with governments and with politicians who advance personal business interests with government ministries. These interests fuel solid competition for the presidency in Kenya and beyond. 

Of course, political processes always have outcomes, whether intended or unintended, and presidential contests are as such. At issue are both the form and the substance of presidential transitions in Kenya.

The big question is how do we ensure that presidential contests are a matter of practical, verifiable and demonstrable ideas, far from the tribal cards that are always at play?

Firstly, presidential candidates and their parties should have their political manifestos/ agenda ready and presented to the public a year before elections. This will provide for adequate public discourse and scrutiny. 

Secondly, there must be a mechanism of auditing the implementation of political manifestos of the ruling party a year to the election by an independent multi-agency body headed by the Auditor General. This will give premium to the seriousness of political commitments made by political parties and their presidential candidates through their manifestos/ agenda.

Thirdly, while Kenya has enacted numerous legislation inspired by foundational principles of good governance in the Constitution, governance challenges abound in all public sectors. The perception of using public office to plunder public resources and utility of political office for personal gain sustain motivations for accessing political office, more so the presidency. It would be helpful device mechanisms of ensuring actual checks and balances in public offices. 

Fourthly, the power of Parliament to determine budgetary allocation for constitutional offices, including constitutional commissions, should be checked. This is informed by the political vendetta meted on public and constitutional offices that try to be visibly independent. They include the Judiciary and constitutional commissions such as the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, which have had their operational budgets significantly cut through political machinations and as a form of punishment. 

The Controller of Budgets should moderate proposed budgets by constitutional bodies and public institutions. This can be done by the amendment of relevant laws and Parliament not having the monopoly of power to vary budgetary proposals. 

Fifthly, the number of political parties should be regulated. The registration of multiple parties in electioneering periods, or utility of fringe political parties to propagate ethnic bargains at the expense of the universality of national politics fragments the body of politics to serve narrow or sectarian political interests. This environment breeds politics railroaded by cartels and special interests.

Sixthly, key political parties and politicians should not have direct control or influence over the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission. The essence of the constitutional protection of IEBC’s independence was to ward off political influence. This is yet to be achieved, going by the direct attacks, attempts at intimidation, and constant calls for the removal of various commissioners, especially in electioneering periods.

Regarding election-based violence, there is a need to undertake thorough planning for general elections and monitor all forms of early warning systems for violence and incitements. This should include assessing the capacity needs of the police, establishing coordination mechanisms at different levels among all relevant governmental and non-governmental actors. Additionally, presidential elections, including election security and public order management, have to be given particular scrutiny. 

Lastly, more steps need to be taken to ensure responsible and objective media coverage of political campaigns and elections, with the intent to illuminate the form and substance within the twists and bends of presidential transition politics.

Successful and peaceful political transitions fortify democracy. This is a principle that the consciousness of the citizenry should properly and eternally guard. High standards of democratic elections, respect of independent institutions and care for free, fair and verifiable elections should be non-negotiable principles. These will be guarantees of peaceful and cherished presidential transitions. 

Mr Javas Bigambo, a lawyer and political scientist, is managing consultant at Interthoughts Consulting